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SOME EVIDENCE ON NON�VOTING MODELS IN THE SPATIAL 
THEORY OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION 
Melvin J. Hinich 
The multidimensional spatial theory of electoral competition 
introduced by Davis and Hinich has been expanded to include forms 
of citizen non-voting which depend on the positions of the candi­
dates. 1 Spatial theory rests on the key assumptions that voters 
share a collllllOn coherent perceptual spatial framework for candidates, 
and that the indifference contours of a voter's utility function are 
ellipsoids. If the ellipsoidal indifference contours have the same 
alignment, these assumptions imply that choice can be rationalized 
by simple Euclidean distance. In a more general spatial model, 
weights on the dimensions of the space vary in the population. 
The dimensions are described as salient political issues 
in previous expositions of the theory, but it is more consistent with 
empirical studies of voter attitudes to conceive of the dimensions 
as heuristic factors which are used by a voter to forecast a 
2 
candidate's behavior with respect to economic and social policy 
once elected to office. 2 ;t is rational for a voter to simplify 
the evaluation process by reducing the complexity of the issue 
space. Since the choice is over representatives and not issues 
per se, a rational voter must forecast how a candidate will behave 
in office. It is reasonable to use past performance and past 
associations as a guide to a candidate's future behavior. More-
over most voters do not have much incentive to invest in information, 
given the small impact of a single vote and the infrequency of 
elections. Thus a simple rule of thumb based on inexpensive but 
noisy information is the best evaluation and choice strategy for 
most voters and even modest contributors. 
To be more specific about spatial theory, assume there 
exists a cardinally defined issue space
 common to all c.itizens 
and that individual,preferences can be represented by the weighted 
Euclidean distance metric: 
11 �j - �r II !'k [(8. - x )·]1/k -J -r 
[ n n I t1 ti aihcaji - xri) cajh - xrh)J 1 k 
where ej = (8.1, • • •  ' e. )' - J JO 
on each of n dimensions , x -r 
denotes the position of candidate 
(xrl' • , xrn) • 
denotes the 
rth eitizen�s j_deal point, and � = (aih) is a positive definite 
nxm matrix of factor weiJI!!.!:�· The usual assumption of spatial 
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theory is that k=l, i.e., if we interpret -II �j - xr II! as a 
utility function, then utility is inversely measured by squared 
distance. The assumption of a common cardinal space, however, is 
. 
problematic since the factors typically possess no natural scale. 
Thus, Citizens may define the space with a particular sensitivity 
to positions that are "far" from their ideal points or alternatively 
they may be sensitive, i.e., perceive differences as substantively 
meaningful, only if positions are "near" their ideal points. To 
accommodate the several possibilities, k is allowed to vary. If 
k=l each citizen is more sensitive to positions that ar� far 
from x -r If k=2, citizens' sensitivity is uniform. If 
k=4, citizens are more cognizant of differences near their ideal 
points. For a given population, k is a parameter that must J:.e 
estimated. 
1. DEVELOPMENT OF A SPATIAL METHODOLOGY 
Two special statistical methodologies have been developed 
to test spatial theory using candidate feeling thermometer scores 
gathered by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center ; namely 
the methods of Cahoon, Hinich, and Ordeshook [ 2'] and Rabinowitz [ 9 ] • 
Suppose now that N respondents rate each of p + 1 national 
political figures on a thermometer scale (that varies from 0 to 100), 
where the number of candidates exceeds the number of issues (p > n), 
and the rth respondent's thermometer score for candidate j takes 
the form 
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100 - [(8. - x ) ' A(8. - x )] + €. -J -r -J -r Jr 
(1) 
and where £. is a stochastic error term. The CHO uses the model Jr 
(1) to map candidates and respondents in a common space for the 1968 
survey. 
Assuming that the thermometer scores is given by (1) for 
each respondent in a sample of the electorate, the CHO goal is to 
identify (estimate) the dimensionality of the issue space, n, each 
candidate's position in the space, 8., each citizen's ideal point, 
-J 
x , and the matrix of issue weights, A. The CHO method, in a nutshell, -r -
approximately modifies the data (thermometer scores) and applies the 
principal components version of factor analysis. That this data 
must be modified in some way follows from the fact that factor analysis 
assuiites a linear model whereas the model of expression (1) is non-
linear (owing to the term x'Ax ). -r--r 
In addition to the spatial model 
itself, the basis assumptions underlying the method are: (1) all 
citizens have the same perception of each candidate; and (2) each 
aih varies independently of x -r in the 
population, e.g., all citizens 
weight the factors in an identical fashion. Clearly, these two 
assumptions, while implicit in metric scaling techniques and while 
possessing a long history in spatial analysis, are restrictive. With-
out the assumption of some structure, however, estimation is impossible. 
As a partial resolution of the problem, then, when analyzing the 
SRC thermometer data they divide the sample by partisian identification 
to demonstrate that there are no significant differences in the 
candidate maps. Of course, there are many interesting partitions of 
the sample which could be analyzed using the methodology 3 
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NON-VOTING 
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Now let us apply this method to the spatial theory of non­
voting. The feeling thermometer scores from the 1968 election 
survey were used by CHO to estimate a joint space containing politi-
cians and respondents. As is discussed in detail in their paper, 
the data supported an assumption that the space had two-dimensional 
with a third valence dimension for the less well-know politicians. 
Weighted Euclidean distances from the respondents to Nixon and were 
calculated from this space for example for Nixon and the :i:Jh 
respondent. The distance is given by 
2 2 1/2 
[al (BNl - xrl) + a2(8N2 - xr2) l ' 
where a
l and a2 are dimension salience weights, 
(2) 
eNl and 8N2 
are Nixon's position coordinates as calculated from the data, and 
xrl and xr2 are the estimated ideal point coordinates. The 
salience weights are assumed to be positive and the same for all 
respondents in a given group. These computed distances are highly 
correlated with the raw thermometer scores. Except for setting the 
cross weight a12 = O, CHO fits the parameters of the basic spatial 
model with its perceptual assumptions. 
The estimated ideal points for the Republican identifiers 
and nonvoters are shown in Figures 1 and 2, where the coordinates 
have been adjusted by the salience weights so that any distance 
between points in these figures is simple Euclidean distance. As a 
consequence, all the ideal points which are closer to Nixon in Figure 
1 should prefer Nixon to Humphrey and vice-versa. For Republican 
identifiers who stated they voted, such a decision rule gave a 95.9 
6 
percent correct prediction rate. Moreover the estimated ideal points 
were consistent with the scores on various issue questions, as is 
discussed in detail in the cited paper, and therefore there is evi-
dence for assuming that the ideal point and candidate map is worth 
using here. 
Not all the respondents were mapped in the space. Since 
it was theoretically important that the respondents were politically 
aware, respondents who did not score 'all the twelve politicians named 
were removed from sample. In addition, respondents who gave a score 
of 50° to four or more politicians were removed since an analysis of 
the raw scores indicated a confounding between a response of 50°· 
and "don't know." Table 1 shows the difference between the total 
and subsample income and education distributions, and also. gives 
the breakdowri of reported voting statistics for the two groups. 
The fact that we are analyzing a subsample of the respondents who 
are of higher income> and education than the total does not invalidate 
the results since the aim of the research is to demonstrate the 
applicability of the spatial model to predicting choice by voters 
who have some political awareness, and not to predict the outcome 
of a given contest which can be better accomplished using paired 
comparison data. 
The subsample was divided into three groups. The first 
group consisted of those respondents who identified themselves as 
strong Democrats, weak Democrats, or Independents who leaned toward 
the Democrats. This latter group was included since a review of the 
data indicated that their preferences were strongly Democratic. 
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The second group consisted of the strong and weak Republican identi-
fiers, and Independents who leaned toward the Republicans. The 
third group consisted of all the Independents, and thus this group 
overlapped with the other two.4 Very similar maps were obtained 
using only strong and weak Republican�, but the larger sample size 
gave better fits. 
Hinich and Ordeshook suggest two models for abstention; 
alienation and indifference. If voters abstain because of alienation, 
then the average distance to the closest .of the two candidates should 
be larger for the nonvoters than the voters.5 If the abstention is 
due to indifference, the average absolute difference in the two 
distances should be smaller for the nonvoters than the voters.6 
The "distances" to Nixon and Humphrey were calculated for 
each respondent. The mean and standard deviations of the minimum 
distance, difference in distances, income, and educatio.nal level for 
the Republicans is shown in Table 2. The indifference hypothesis 
is sustained but alienation is not. The univariate F-ratios and the 
within-groups correlation matrix used in a discriminant analysis 
approach is given in Table 3.7 The income variable is highly signi-
ficant and the difference in distances variable is significant at the 
0.05 level assuming a F(l,242) distribution. The minimum distance is 
insignificant. The education variable is almost 0.05 significant. 
Thus the abstention from indifference model seems to hold some promise 
for predicting nonvoting, but the alienation model is rejected for 
this data base, although, Rosenthal and Sen show it is of significance 
for predicting a type of abstention in voting for the French Assembly.8 
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The educational level is scored from one to five: l 
elementary or no schooling, 2 -- high school, 3 -- high school plus 
trade school, 4 -- college and 5 -- post graduate. With this coding 
the correlation between income and education is only 0. 29. The 
negative 0.21 correlation between education and minimum distance shows 
that the respondents whose ideal points are extreme tend to have 
lower education. This correlation is due to the way ideal points 
are estimated. If a respondent gives one politician a much higher 
score than another when most of the group give them similar scores, 
then the respondent's ideal point is located towards the fringe of 
the space by the procedure. Socially conservative Republicans with 
low education gave Rockefeller much lower scores than the rest of 
the Republicans. 
As a more "sophisticated" statistical test, a Bayesian 
discriminant analysis9 was performed on the Republican voters and 
nonvoters using a p1=0.5 and the "natural" prior for nonvoting 
p
1 
= 31/244. For p
1 
= 0.5, out of the 31 nonvoters 20 were 
classified correctly and 11 .were not. Of the 213 voters, 130 were 
classified correctly and 83 were not. The overall percent correctly 
classified was 61.5 percent. 
When p
1
=0.127 was used, all Republicans were classified 
as voters. Thus the 31 nonvoters were misclassified but the overall 
percent correctly classified was 87.3 percent. Even when pl was 
increased to 0.25, all Republicans were classified as voters. Even 
though income and indifference were significant, the large proportion 
of voters in the sample dominated the classification. 
The indifference model was not significant for the 
Democrats where the F-ratio for Diffdist was a mere 0.29 with 39 
nonvoters out of 317. Even the income variable had a meager F­
ratio of 3.26 but the difference in means had the correct sign, 
since the mean income of voters was $9,332 whereas the mean for 
the nonvoters was $7,666. The mean difference in distances for 
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the voters was 0.59 which is less than the mean of 0.62 for the 
nonvoters. The Independents showed a weak indifference effect which 
was barely significant for the raw scores but statistically 
insignificant for the computed distances. 
The within-groups correlation matrix for the Democrats 
and Independents was roughly the same as for the Republicans, but 
the negative correlation between education and the minimum 
distance was insignificant. 
As a check, I computed the mean and standard error of the 
difference between the thermometer scores of Nixon and Humphrey for 
the Republican voters and nonvoters. The mean difference for the voters 
is 38 with a standard error of 4. 7. The mean difference for the 
nonvoters is 27 with a standard error of 4.4. The difference of 
11 is statistically significant. On the other hand, both groups 
had a mean maximum score of 84, reinforcing the hypothesis that the 
alienation effect is negligable or non-existent. 
For the whole sample all that we can say is that the higher 
income people tend to be more likely to vote and th/lt the abstention 
from alienation model can be rejected for the 1968 election survey. 
Income 
Less than $1,999 
$2,000-3,999 
$4,000-5,999 
$6,000-7,999 
$8,000-9,999 
$10,000-11,999 
$12,000-14,999 
$15 ,000-19 ,999 
$20,000-24,999 
$25,000 or more 
Education 
Level 
Eight Grades 
• or less 
Between Eight 
and Twelve 
Some or all of 
college 
Advanced Degrees 
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Table 1 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS 
Percent of Percent of Subsample 
Population Sample in in Each Income 
Each Income Group Group 
9.0 4.2 
14.2 10.4 
13.4 11.l 
18.4 19.6 
13.0 16.3 
11.l 11,9 
9.5 12.2 
6.0 7.0 
2.0 2.6 
3.3 4. 6
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS O F  RESPONDENTS 
Percent of 
Population Sample 
in Each Educational Group 
21.3 
40.0 
34.6 
4.1 
--
Percent of Subsample 
in Each Educational 
Group 
13.1 
35.2 
45.3 
6.5 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
NON-VOTING 
Population Sample Subsample 
V oted 75.8% 86.5% 
Abstained 24.2% 13.5% 
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Table 2 
REPUBLICAN VOTER AND NON-VOTER STATISTICS 
MEANS 
Non-Voters Voters 
Number 31 213 
Mindist 1.64 2.16 
Diffdist 0.54 o. 77 
Incoine 6,664 10,907 
Educ 2.84 3.24 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
Non-Voters Voters 
Min dist 1.14 2.11 
Diffdist 0.52 0.60 
Income 4,151 6,563 
Educ 1.07 1.06 
Total 
244 
2.09 
0.74 
10,368 
3,19 
Total 
2.02 
0.59 
6,458 
1.07 
Mindist 
1.80 
Min dist 
Diffdist 
Income 
Educ 
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Table 3 
REPUBLICAN DISCRIMINANT STATISTICS 
F-ratios 
Diffdist Income 
4.18 12.22 
WITHIN-GROUPS CORRELATION MATRIX 
1.00 
0.22 1.00 
-0.02 -0.01 · 1.00 
-0.21 0.09 0,29 
Mindis t Diffdist Income 
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FOOTNOTES 
Spatial theory is. an extension and formalization of the pioneering 
ideas of Downs [5] and Black [l]. For a review of s patial theory, 
see Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook[4]. 
2. The connection between issues and dimensions is discussed in the 
spatial analysis of the candidate feeling thermometer scores from 
the 1968 election survey by Cahoon, Hinich, and Ordeshook [2]. 
Also see Rabinowitz [9) and Rusk and Weis berg [11). 
3. 
4. 
The methodology and its application to the 1968 survey is 
summarized in Cahoon, Hinich, and Ordeshook [2]. The details 
of the
· 
statistical methodology are present in the PhD thesis of 
Lawrence Cahoon, Statistics Department, Carnegie-Mellon 
Uniyers ity , (July 1975). 
The blacks were deleted, however, from the Democrats and 
Independents since they gave Robert Kennedy much higher scores
than the whites and thus it s eemed that they should be treated 
as a special group (only one black identified with the 
Republicans ). Unfortunately, there were not enough blacks in
the sample to sustain a s patial analysis. 
5. Using an indirect approach , Page and Brody [8] show s ome positive
support for the indifference model in 1968, but there is some 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
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question about their interpre t ation of the formal definition. 
In any event, the effect on turnout of the candidates' positions 
is very weak if it exists . 
This definition of indifference also captures the cross­
pressure phenomenon. See Hinich and Ordeshook [6]. 
The F-distribution is valid for thes e ratios if the data came 
from a multivariate normal distribtition. However, the income 
distribution is non-normal. I tried a logarithmic transformation 
on the incomes to reduce the effect of large incomes and obtained 
similar F-ratios. Given the sample size, and the invariance 
of the results using the logs, the F-ratios suggest the true 
magnitude of the importance of the individual variables. 
See Rosenthal and Sen [10]. 
See Johnston, Econometric Methods, (2nd edition), 336 [7]. 
Acknowledgement. I would like to thank Edward Beauvais for his valuable 
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